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STATEMENT OF CASE
This action arose on an Order to Show Cause in Re
Modification wherein Appellant Mable Laak sought to increase
the alimony provisions of the original Decree of Divorce.
DISPOSITION IN
THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court denied Appellant's Motion and Order
to Show Cause in Re Modification and continued the alimony at
$200.00 per month.
•RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks to have the alimony provisions contained in the Decree of Divorce modified upward to the sum of
Three Hundred Fifty Dollars per month.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were first married in early 1950. Two
minor children were born as issue of the marriage of the parties,
to wit: Walter L. Laak, Jr., born December 2, 1950, and Gary
Roger Laak, born Septeiober 10, 1354, (R.l)

The parties were sub-

sequently divorced and remarried in September, 1960, (R.l).

On

November 6, 1963, the plaintiff, Walter L. Laak, filed an action
in divorce against the defendant, Mable Laak (R.3).
Mrs. Laak, in response to Mr. Laak's Complaint in divorce, entertained a Separate Maintenance suit against Mr. Laak,
(R.12).
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On November 29, 1963, the parties entered into a
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, (R.7-10).
Stipulation provided as follows:
1.

v

i^

The
-

Defendant was awarded the following items: ,
(a)

$200.00 per month as permanent alimony, ef-

fective upon the legal emancipation of Gary Roger Laak.
(b)

Equity derived from the sale of the home of

the parties after payment of £1,171.32 on bills, and $500 to
Mrs, Laak's attorney.
(c)

Property located in Cedar City, Utah, as her

sole and separate property.

2.

(d)

Motor vehicle, subject to its indebtedness.

(e)

All the household furnishings and furniture.

The plaintiff Mr. Laak received a motor vehicle,

subject to its indebtedness and a 10-share certificate of railroad stock and was obligated to pay:
(a)

$350.00 per month as child support.

(b)

The Outstanding loans against two insurance

policies, to be paid in a period of 10 years.
(c)

Health insurance for the benefit of the minor

(d)

Back taxes for the property located in Cedar

children.

City, for the year 1968,

This Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement were
specifically incorporated into the Decree of Divorce which was
entered on December 3, 1963, (R.19-23).
On October 9, 1969, the parties herein again entered into a Stipulation, which provided for a change of custody of Walter
L. Laak, Jr., from liable Laak to Walter L. Laak.

The Stipulation

also provided for a reduction in Mr. Laak's child support payments
reducing the amount to $75.00 per month, for the benefit of Gary
Laak. Who was under the control of the juvenile authorities.
In addition, Mr. Laak was to pay to Mable Laak, the sum
of $200.00 per month as alimony, (R.43-44). On October
10, 1969, the Court entered its Order incorporating the
referenced written Stipulation into its Order, (R.45-46).
Finally, on November 29, 1974, the Court again entered
its Order based upon Stipulation of the parties and their respective counsel, wherein the Order stated:
"It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Plaintiff be ordered to continue the payment of alimony at the rate of $200.00 per
month under the terms and conditions as prescribed in the original Decree and that this
Order is based upon the existing circumstances
at the time of the original Decree."
"It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that each and every other term and condition
of the original Decree of Divorce is in full
force and effect*" i{R*90-91).
Thereafter, Mable Laak filed and sought a modification
of the Decree of Divorce to raise the alimony based upon a change
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of circumstances, (R.92-93, 100-101).

Appellant sought the in-

' crease based upon three factors which she alleged constitute a
substantial change of circumstances:
(a)

Walter L. Laak's earnings had substantially

(b)

The minor children of the parties are no longer

increased.

:

minors and respondent doesn't pay any child support.
.(c)-... Appellant's needs have increased, (R.92-93).
(Appellant's Brief, Page 2 ) .
The plaintiff presently pays alimony to the defendant
in the amount of $200.00 per month and is current on all said
payments, (R.106-107).

That during the calendar year, 1974,

the defendant's net earnings were $1,102.00 per month, (R.147,
L10-11).

That the defendant was 51 years old, (R.128, L25-26),

and presently unemployed but drawing unemployment compensation
since July, 1974, in the amount of $23.00 per week, (R.106-107).
That defendant's living expenses were approximately $388.00 per
month, (R.92).

That ttie defendant was healthy, capable and had

no physical infirmities of alny kind whatsoever, and had been

i

continuously employed since the divorce, (R.124, L14-21).

<

she can handle jobs without difficulty, (R.123, L23-30).

That
She

stated she will find work, (R.127, L29 - R.128, L 3 ) . It is her
desire to work, (R.127, L26-30).

I
1

Mr. Laak is presently providing over half of Mrs. Laak's
monthly living expanses.

This leaves Mrs. Laak to her own re-

sources to come up with less than half or approximately 48 percent of her needs.

This will require her to earn no more than

$188.00 per month.
She has demonstrated through a continuous course of
employment, that she has the ability to do this and as late as
August 5, 1974# when she terminated at the J.C. Penny Company,
she was making, according to her 1974 tax return, for the first
7 months of 1974, at least $265.71 per month.
Mr. Laak is still paying on some of the Divorce Decree
obligations, and while looking forward to his date of retirement
when he will experience a decrease in his earning capacity, he
will remain faced with the continuing obligation of payment of
$200.00 per month alimony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: WHEN A STIPULATION, WHICH IS INCOPORATED
INTO THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, PROHIBITS
MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY UPWARD, DOES
THE COURT HAVE THE POWER TO MODIFY THE
ORIGINAL DECREE;.'.:.
The Utah Courts have the general power to modify a
Decree of Divorce for alimony or support, and that power is not
affected by the fact that the Decree is based on an agreement
entered into by the parties to the action.
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(Section 30-3-5, Utah

Code Annoted, 1953, As Amended; Buzzo v. Buzzo [1915] 45 Utah
625, 148P. 362; Barraclough v. Barraclough [1941] 100 Utah 196,
111 P.2d 792; Jones v. Jones [1943] 104 Utah 275f 139 P.2d 222;
Callister v, Callister [1953] 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 and Felt
v. Felt, [1972] 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620).
POINT II: WHEN THE STIPULATION AND THE ORIGINAL DECREE
CONTEMPLATE THE VERY THING COMPLAINED OF IN
THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY
THE MODIFICATION SHOULD BE DENIED.
Petitions of this kind should be entertained with great
caution and the Court snould be very slow under the circumstances
to revise or alter the former Decree.

(Viles v. Viles [C.A.3

Virgin Islands, 1953] 316 F2d 31 and Kate v. Kate [1951] 234
Minn. 402, 48 N.?2d 551.)
Both parties were advised by competent counsel, and it
is clear by the working of the Stipulation that the parties unquestionably had a specific intention in the settlement of alimony on a permanent basis, planning for the future events which
have taken place.
"Defendant agrees that she does not need alimony at
the present time and requests the court to enter its
order to the effect that upon the legal emancipation
of Gary Roger Laak she be awarded the sum of $200
per month as permanent alimony and that plaintiff
agrees that the court may enter its order providing
that upon the legal emancipation of Gary Roger Laak
he be ordered to pay for the benefit of defendant,
the sum of $200 per month constituting permanent alimony, not subject to modification upward by
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defendant. Walter L. Laak and Mable Laak further
state that they understand that in the event Mable
Laak remarries between the time of the divorce decree
and the time alimony is set to commence or after
alimony commences, her right to alimony shall be
forever terminated." (R.7-8, emphasis added,)
Gary Roger Laak was born September 10, 1954, R,l)# and
his emancipation would not have occurred until age 21 in 1975
or by marriage, (Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953) and must have been
CQiatemplated by the parties with advice of counsel.

He is emanci-

pated and is no longer in need of child support, (having joined the
military service,) (R.1-31/-L19-20).

The emancipation of Gary

Roger Laak took place on or Before July 20, 1974, (R.66).
Mrs, Laak was unemployed at the time of the divorce,
(R.122),

Yet, she stated that she did not need alimony at the

time the divorce was granted.
By inference, it would appear that Mrs, Laak had carefully considered the situation and decided that she could appropriately live until the emancipation of the youngest minor child
of the parties in 1975, on the basis of child support in the
amount of $350 per month, the assets awarded to her in the Decree
of Divorce, and her own individual earnings, although not mentioned*
On October 9, 1969, the parties again entered into
a Stipulation and Order, thereon dated October 10, 1969, which
provided Mable L. Laak with alimony in the amount of $200 per
month.
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The Stipulation and Order also transferred custody of
Walter L. Laak, Jr., to his father.

The Stipulation and Order

also provided that the father, Mr. Laak, pay support in the
amount of $75 per month to the Department of Family Services
for Gary Roger Laak who left the home of his mother and placed
himself in the hands of the juvenile authorities, (R.43-46 and
R.149, L7-12).
It appears to have been the intention of the parties
and the Court at that time to make adjustments because of new
circumstances existing at that time.

Custody of one of the

children was transferred from Mrs. Laak to the father and the
other child was placed in the care of the juvenile authorities
and payments in child support by Mr. Laak no longer were going
to Mrs. Laak but were being paid at a reduced amount to the Department of Family Services.

This was approximately one year after

the Decree of Divorce, during which time Mrs. Laak remained
unemployed, apparently having decided not to work until this
time.

(R.122, L27-29).
The next Order that was entered by the Court was

dated November 29, 1974.

That Order specifically states as

follows:
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Plaintiff be ordered to continue the payment of
alimony at the rate of $200.00 per month under:, the
terms and conditions as prescribed in the original
Decree and that this Order is based upon the existing

circumstances at the time of the original Decree*
"It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
each and every other term and condition of the original Decree of Divorce is in full force and effect."
(R.90-91, emphasis added).
This Order was likewise stipulated to by the parties
with the advice of their counsel, (R.90).
Careful reading of the Order implies that it was the
intent of the parties and the Court that the payment of the
alimony at the rate of $200 per month, as of November 29, 1974,
would be based upon the existing circumstances at the time of
the original Decree and that each and every term and condition
of the original Decree of Divorce would be in full force and
effect.
Mrs. Laak, at this time, was unemployed and had been
unemployed since July of 1974.

Gary Roger Laak, at this time,

was emancipated, having been emancipated on or before July 20,
1974, (R.66).

Mrs. Laak also had whatever was remaining of the

assets and equities originally awarded to her at the time of
the entry of the Decree.
Viles v. Viles (C.A. 3 Virgin Islands, 1963) 316F 2d
31 is specifically on point.

The Court, in that case, consi-

dered §13 of the divorce law of the Virgin Islands, 1944, 16
V.I.C, §110, which expressly granted the District Court powers
to "set aside, alter or modify so much of the judgment as may
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provide alimony ...or the maintenance of either party in the
action." (Ibid, at page 33). In that case, the original
Decree made the determination that so long as the husband's
total annual income should be $17,500 or more, he would pay his
wife support in the amount of $5,500 per year in equal monthly
installments.

The Decree also had a ". *.provision for reduction

of annual payments 'proportionately1 to not less than $3,600
whenever the husband's income should fall below $17,500."
at page 32.)

(Ibid.

"...so long as the husband's income did not fall

below $11,455."

(Ibid at 35.)

The trial court gave the defen-

dant relief, reducing his payments to $2,500 annually although
his income had not fallen below the $11,455 figure.
The Circuit Court went on to say that:

"The fact that

an award of alimony has been based on a separage agreement may provide a sound reason for judicial reluctance to modify the original Decree.

:

"...the original decree should be treated as a final
adjudication of the rights of the parties at the time
it is entered, and the court which entered it should be
presumed, in the absence of a direct appeal, to have
given appropriate consideration to the circumstances
which should have affected its judgment. ...Moreover,
it is quite proper for the court, in framing the original
decree, to anticipate future changes in circumstances
of the parties and to provide specific adjustments of
the postmarital rights and duties of the parties which
will be made in the event that the circumstances do
change as anticipated. ...When it is clear that the
court which entered the original decree has considered
and provided for future eventualities, the party
seeking a modification of h is obligation should be
required to prove more than what the events anticipated have actually occurred."
-10-

The Utah Supreme Court has followed that line of
reasoning in its decision on Short v» Short, [1971] 25 Utah 2d
326, 481 P2d 54. When a husband petitioned for modification
of alimony because his former wife had obtained employment, the
Court determined that the modification should be denied where
the original award was obviously based on the assumption that
the wife, who had previously held a job, would again be able
to obtain employment.
The Court stated:
"We think the facts in this case themselves reflect no
• abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in refusing to vacate the $75 alimony award," ...the
denial was not capricious when viewed in the light
of circumstances existing at the time of the decree,
the $75 award implemented by a necessary and inescapable assumption by the court that Mrs. S. could
not survive under any conceivable hypothesis on $75
per month, and there is nothing in the record to
indicate she had any other means of livlihood."
{Ibid, at page 327).
Also, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in analyzing this
same problem stated:
"...the alimony awarded in (the original decree) was
fixed by a bargain and not by an original judicial determination of the amount to which defendant was then
entitled. If defendant wishes to default on her bargain, she may not at the same time seek to use it as
a measure of her present rights. If the alimony which
she is presently receiving is adequate, considering
all of the factors governing an original award, then
there is no occasion to modify the award merely because the alimony that she bargained for and received
in (the original Decree) gave her a better standard of
living then than it does today. The circumstances of
the parties may have changed materially, and yet,
if defendant drove a hard bargain in her original
agreement for a property settlement and alimony, she
may still be receiving all that a court would be required to award her if it were considering the matter

originally. In such a case, there is no abuse of discretion if the trial Court determines that no revision
of the decree is•necessary." (Kate v. Kate, Supra.)
It would appear that defendant's present circumstances
are created by her.

Although she was terminated from the J. C.

Penny Company on August 5, 1974, (R.122, L 16) she was able to
earn $1,860 for only seven month's work, (R.92).

Her tax return

does not reflect unemployment compensation which has been paid to
her and at the time of the hearing, was still being paid to her
at the rate of $23 per week*. (R.123, L 16-19).

Therefore, in

addition to the $200 per month received from the plaintiff in
alimony, she received $265 per month for the seven months of
employment at J. C. Penny Company, and during those months
she was on unemployment, she received a monthly compensation
of approximately $99 per month.
In King v. King, [1970] 25 Utah 2d 163, 478 P2d 492,
which was remanded for rehearing and an appeal taken from the
rehearing in King v. King, [19y2] 27 Utah 2d 313, 495 P2d 823,
the facts and circumstances were very similar to this case
except there were no minor children from the marriage.
In King, the parties married in 1949 when
the plaintiff was 37 years old.
of

The marriage lasted a total

16 years and at the time of the divorce the plaintiff,

wife, would have been 53 years old.

I

The plaintiff wife was given the most substantial part

of the family assets:
1.

The family home with an equity of between $12,000

and $14,000.
2.

The furniture.

3.

Each of the parties got an automobile.

4.

The defendant paid all of the family debts and

obligations.
5.

The defendant paid $250 per month alimony to plain-

tiff until the home was paid off;
6.

Upon pay-off of the home, the defendant paid $200

per month alimony thereafter.
In 1967, the defendant ran into some financial problems associated with the Kennecott Copper Corporation strike
which lasted for 6 months. As a result of the strike, the
plaintiff filed an action against the defendant in Re: Contempt
for nonpayment and the defendant filed an Order to Show Cause
to reduce alimo y.
In the Court't deliberation, they compared the present
status of the parties to their status at the time of the divorce.
The Court considered the defendant's income which had remained
approximately the same.

The Court recognized as a subordinate

obligation, the fact that the defendant had remarried a woman
with four children by a previous marriage and for which she
was receiving some income.
However, the main consideration of the Court was that

the plaintiff, at the time of the divorce, ..was suffering from
a nervous disorder and back trouble which prevented her from
being gainfully employed.

At the time of the hearing on the

Order to Show Cause to reduce alimony, the Court found, (1J the
plaintiff was capable of doing everything but the heaviest
of lifting after a successful back fusion; (2) that she was
capable of engaging in normal household activities and, (3) that
she had had two or three different jobs, although for short
periods of time.

The Court found that the health of the

plaintiff had improved to the extent that the plaintiff was
able to seek and accept gainful employment, although she was,
at the time of the hearing, unemployed.
It was the Trial Court's Order that the alimony be
reduced to $100 per month for six months and then to $50 per
month for one year, and thereafter alimony would be terminated.
On the second appeal, the Utah Supreme Court modified and affirmed
the Trial Court's decision to provide that alimony continue in
a nominal sum in the event that plaintiff would not be able to
sustain herself in the event of unforeseeable circumstances.
In the case at bar, Mrs. Laak has demonstrated and
testified that she is fully and completely capable of employment,
that she does receive a substantial alimony payment which amounts
to more than 50 percent of her living expenses*

Mrs. Laak is

young, 51 years of age, and need only provide $138 per month
to meet all of her monthly requirements.

She has dmonstrated

her ability to do this in the past and has ^provided no evidence that she is not capable of doing so presently and in the
future.
In appellant's brief, page 6, she alleges that modification should be granted because of a material change of
conditions and she lists the following three:
(a)

Walter Laak's earnings had significantly increased;

(b)

The respondent no longer paid any child support;

(c)

Mable Laak's expenses had increased.

It would appear that each and every one of the alleged
material changes in circumstances were completely identifiable,
and were in fact identified at the time of the entry of the
Stipulation in the original Decree and were anticipated and
onceded at the time of the original Decree.
Obviously, since the Stipulation provided that her
alimony would start only after the last minor child had been
emancipated, it can be no surprise or materially changed circumstance that the respondent no longer pays any child support upon emancipation of the parties' last minor child and that
plaintiff would not benefit from that change.
Mr. Laak also was employed by the railroad at the
time he was married to Mrs. Laak and obviously would be receiving wage increases and has been receiving wage increases for
the past 7 years.

This also must have been anticipated by

Mrs. Laak and can come as no surprise to her that Mr. Laak
-15-

is earning additional monies.
However, Mrs. Laak must have realized and anticipated that she would be employed during this period of time
and her wages would have increased or at least been sufficient
enough to pay at least half of her needs.
Alimony should not be made a form of retirement
fund as prayed for by Mrs. Laak on page 8 of appellant's
brief, wherein she feels that alimony should be raised to $350
per month leaving her only a difference of $33 to meet her
stated monthly obligation of $3 88 per month or if she were to
cut some of her expenses by $33 she could effectively retire
at age 51.
It is the respondent's contention that the Trial
Court carefully reviewed and considered each and every one of
these points and made its decision fully within the sound discretion afforded the Trial Court.
CONCLUSION
The appellant should be precluded from going beyond the Order of the Court dated November 29, 1974, which
reinstated the terms and conditions of the original Decree of
Divorce and ordered the continued payment of alimony at the
rate of $200 per month.
Alimony should not be a form of retirement, and a
healthy and capable individual should provide at least one-half
of her income, especially if her contribution would be at a

nominal amount of $188 per month.

-

Finally, when all of the facts and circumstances considered by a party petitioning for a modification, are the same
facts and circumstances that were in existence and considered
by the parties at the time that the original Stipulation and
Decree of Divorce were entered, and when the Stipulations in
those proceedings were bargained for and the resulting circumstances were fully anticipated seven years ago, then they
are not the substantial material change necessary.

Respectfully submitted,
KING & CRAFT
By
DALE J. CRAFT
Attorney for Respondent
4 09 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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